

INTELLIGENCE

Sun Tzu said, "Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and engaging them in war entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop out exhausted.

"Opposing forces may face each other for years, striving for the victory which may be decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver is the height of stupidity.

"One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his cause, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise commander to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Hence the use of spies, of which there are five classes:

- 1) *Local spies*—Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of an enemy territory.
- 2) *Moles*—Having moles means making use of officials of the enemy.

- 3) *Double agents*—Having double agents means getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
- 4) *Doomed spies*—Having doomed spies means doing certain things openly for purposes of deception and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy (in other words, spies that are considered expendable and thus are given fabricated information).
- 5) *Surviving spies*—Surviving spies are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.

When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called 'divine manipulation of the threads.' It is the commander's most precious faculty. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other fields should greater secrecy be preserved.

"(1) Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity; (2) They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness; (3) Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports; (4) Be subtle! Be subtle! And use your spies for every kind of warfare; (5) If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.

"Whether the object be to crush an enemy, to storm a territory, or to kill an enemy general, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

"The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away, and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

"Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five

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varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the double agent. Hence it is essential that the double agent be treated with the utmost liberality.

"Hence it is only the enlightened and wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are the most important asset, because on them depends an army's ability to march."

Chang Yu (Sung Dynasty), interpreting Sun Tzu, said, "In our dynasty Chief of Staff Ts'ao once pardoned a condemned man whom he then disguised as a monk and caused to swallow a ball of wax and enter Tangut. When the false monk arrived he was imprisoned. The monk told his captors about the ball of wax and soon discharged a stool. When the ball was opened, the Tanguts read a letter transmitted by Chief of Staff Ts'ao to their Director of Strategic Planning. The chieftain of the barbarians was enraged, put his minister to death, and executed the spy monk. This is the idea. But expendable agents are not confined to only one use. Sometimes I send my agents to the enemy to make a covenant of peace and then I attack."

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

I don't think I could have said it as well as Sun Tzu did 2,000 years ago, but I can expand on it. In any type of warfare, intelligence about the enemy is paramount. If you are not doing a good job of it, you will lose.

Information is not intelligence—information is just something someone said. If you can confirm the information through other independent sources, it becomes intelligence. This chapter is dedicated to the methods of how to obtain and process information into intelligence.

In the military, it is not enough to simply have the proper clearance to get intelligence on a subject. You must have *the need to know*. Intelligence is provided only to those who need it in order to accomplish their mission. Intelligence matters must be held in secret because if the enemy knows you have

a certain piece of information, that information becomes worthless to you. It can also compromise your sources or, even worse, cause the enemy to change his actions, which can lead to your defeat.

ORGANIZATION

Intelligence is not something deduced; it has to be sought, and it has to be worked for. This means it must be planned and controlled.

As in any operation, planning cannot be overemphasized. Intelligence operations are the responsibility of the resistance intelligence officer, or G-2.

The following functions are within the organization of the intelligence section:

Underground. This is the branch that consists of spies, informants, their handlers, and the operatives that perform such tasks as sabotage, infiltration of the enemy's institutions, mob control, and assassination.

Information Officer. The information officer is responsible for such things as psychological operations, providing information and misinformation, and spreading propaganda to the people and the outside world.

Military Intelligence. It is this group's job to gain and maintain intelligence on enemy military units, their emplacements, methods of operating, commanders, weapons, logistics, strengths, weaknesses, and what is termed the enemy's "order of battle."

Counterintelligence. Methods and procedures must be devised and enforced to prevent or minimize the enemy's ability to develop intelligence about the resistance.

Cell Organization

The underground is primarily organized into cells (fig. 48). The reason for this organization is security. The individ-

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ual agent does not know the other agents; he has operational contact with the cell handler only. The cell handler manages the cell. At most, only four people can be compromised.

The cell handler reports to a network manager through a "cutout" (fig. 49). Net managers get their orders and direction from the area underground director. The director reports to the area commander.

CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS

All communications between cell handlers and the net manager is through the cutouts. All communications are clandestine. None of the individuals know each others real names or identities.

Here is an example of a possible communications technique. The cell handler knows that he is to watch for a mark of a certain color on a certain day at a certain location. If that




Figure 48.




Figure 49.

mark is present, he must pick up a message at a secret location. This message will be left at a hiding place that is known to him, such as behind a loose brick. This is known as a "dead letter drop." This message may contain instructions or a requirement for information. Often this message will contain instructions on the location and marking signal of the next dead drop.

The person that drops the message may go to a distant location to casually observe the drop site to ensure that the message is picked up within a certain window of time and that the handler has not been followed. If it is not picked up at the proper time, it is considered null and void.

Sometimes cells can be given instructions or signals via a radio broadcast. The cell member would listen for a code at a certain time on a known frequency.

Often, it may be necessary to pass items between the cell

and the net manager. Instructions may be given at a drop to meet someone at a certain place at a specific time. Instructions would include "all clear" and authentication codes. The information is passed between the operatives in a way that raises no suspicion. Usually, the person that takes on the function of cutout in this situation is not the usual cutout but a courier whom the cell handler has never seen.

To illustrate this, the following example is submitted. The cell handler has become aware of enemy plans that will directly affect resistance operations. The standard operating instructions for the network provides for priority communications between the handler and net manager by a pre-arranged signal. This is a clandestine signal that is monitored perhaps daily to tell either party that a priority communication is required. In order to keep it secret, this means is rarely used.

A message is passed from the handler to a courier acting as a cutout after observing proper authentication signals and codes. The exchange may be monitored by the net manager from a distance to ensure that the transfer is not compromised in any obvious way.

If the net manager feels that the transfer was not compromised, he leaves a signal to indicate to the courier that he can transfer the message. If the signal is not present, the courier goes to an alternate signal location at a designated time to look for the signal.

Upon recognizing the all-clear signal, the courier leaves a signal at another location to indicate that he feels that he has not been compromised and has recognized the all clear left by the net manager. The courier then performs the transfer to the net manager using a preplanned technique such as dead letter drop or face-to-face exchange using proper recognition codes and authentication phrases.

From the time this operation is started, all personnel use evasive techniques to determine if they are being fol-

lowed and to prevent it. Individuals act casual and do not take actions that would raise suspicions, even if they are being watched.

Any signal left should be made in a preplanned way that would be difficult to recognize if someone were watching. For example, while palming a small piece of specific colored crayon, the person leaving the mark stops to pull up his sock. While doing so, he rests his hand against the wall to balance himself, leaving a small colored mark as the predesignated signal. Similarly, when an individual looks to see if a signal has been left, it should not be obvious.

This procedure takes time, because this type of operation should not be hurried. If a member of the underground is compromised, he can be captured at best. At worst, he will not know of the compromise, and others could be compromised. This can make the cell ineffective for an extended period.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS

The resistance intelligence officer divides the operational area into logical zones. These zones will probably be along the lines established by the resistance command.

The intelligence officer places a trained intelligence operative in charge of the underground in each zone with the mission of establishing and maintaining an effective intelligence-gathering organization in that zone. We will call this operative a "zone leader."

The zone leader establishes his staff and develops a detailed written assessment of known information about the area, to include, but not limited to:

- Enemy leaders
- Military installations and units (to include unit designations)
- Potential targets

- Climate
- Industry
- Transportation
- Political, economic, and social problems and strengths
- Enemy strengths and weaknesses
- Educational institutions
- Religion and religious leaders
- Ethnic makeup
- Local attitudes toward the enemy
- Communication facilities
- Geography
- History
- Local leaders

All information is categorized and indexed in a form that will allow quick and easy retrieval and update. Primitive conditions may dictate keeping records in primitive ways such as notebooks or card files, although the use of computers in some areas may be possible. Whatever methods are used, they must be carefully controlled, and there should be a backup. They should also be capable of being destroyed easily and quickly.

Information about enemy military units should be plotted on a map using standardized military symbols. This information should be maintained and kept as up to date as possible.

Zones can be logically divided into smaller areas. These areas can be given names. These names are used to store information about the areas for easy retrieval. As an example, if the information is to be stored in an indexed file, it is stored by the given name for easy access.

Recruitment

In each area, spotters will be placed. Spotters live in the area and either are or become intimately aware of the people in the area who may be inclined to be sympathetic to the

resistance. They also look for individuals who are aggressive in their opposition to the resistance. The people the spotter looks for are potential agents in the network or potential targets for termination. Potential agents must be intelligent and motivated ideologically against the enemy.

The spotters also look for people who are in influential or informed positions who could be bribed or coerced into cooperating. Spotters take note of vulnerabilities of enemy leaders.

Tu Yu said, *"We select men who are clever, talented, wise, and able to gain access to those of the enemy who are intimate with sovereign and members of the nobility. Thus they are able to observe the enemy's movements and learn of his doings and his plans. Having learned the true state of affairs, they return to tell us. Therefore they are called 'living' agents."*

Tu Mu said, *"These are people who can come and go and communicate reports. As living spies we must recruit men who are intelligent but appear to be stupid; who seem to be dull but are strong in heart; men who are agile, vigorous, hardy, and brave; well-versed in lowly matters and able to endure hunger, cold, filth, and humiliation."*

"Of all those in the army close to the commander, none is more intimate than the secret agent; of all rewards none are more liberal than those given to secret agents; of all matters, none is more confidential than those relating to secret operations."

Sun Tzu said, *"If plans relating to secret operations are prematurely divulged, the agent and all those whom he spoke of them shall be put to death."*

The spotter must not let it be known that he is a spotter. He must not raise any suspicion.

The spotter only identifies candidates. He gives information about the candidates to a recruiter. Such candidates can be classed as sympathetic and unsympathetic.

Sympathetic

Sympathetic candidates are those who are not aligned with the enemy and tend to dislike the enemy. They include:

who are aggressive people: the spotter of potential targets. Intelligent and

influential or coerced into cooperation by enemy leaders.

talented, wise, and intimate with sovereigns. Able to observe the enemy's plans. Having a high opinion of themselves. Therefore they

and go and command. Those who are intelligent but are strong in their own will, well-versed in the art of war, and humiliation.

Under none is more liberal than the one who is more confident.

Opinions are premeditated. The words of them shall be as arrows.

He is a spotter.

He gives information. Candidates can be recruited.

He is not aligned with the enemy. They include:

- Persons who have a relative or friend who has been harmed by the enemy.
- Persons who have seen injustice and mistreatment by the enemy.
- Loners who have few friends but tend to sympathize with the resistance or are disaffected by the enemy government.
- Prostitutes who are patronized by enemy leaders or soldiers.
- Intellectuals who realize the harm the enemy oppression is causing to the people.
- Government officials who are worthy men but may have been deprived of office. Others who have committed errors and have been punished. Greedy officials who have remained too long in a lowly office. Those who have not obtained responsible positions, and those whose sole desire is to take advantage of times of trouble to extend the scope of their own powers. Those who are two-faced, changeable, and deceitful who are always sitting on the fence.

In the case of sympathetic candidates, the recruiter for that area attempts to recruit the individual to serve the resistance underground. The recruiter usually will try to establish a friendship with the candidate and gain his/her trust. (Recruiters should be good at dealing with people and persuasive.) From the beginning, the recruiter attempts to analyze the candidate's psychology, political inclinations, goals, fears, and ambitions. He must be careful not to patronize or be overly aggressive in developing a relationship with the candidate.

If and when the recruiter feels the candidate would be sympathetic to helping the resistance, he attempts to recruit him or her. Often the recruiter can accomplish this without the candidate realizing that it is deliberate. This is desirable for more than one reason. For security reasons, the recruiter will want to leave the area after all recruiting in that area has

been accomplished (ideally, all recruitment is culminated at the same time). Also, the candidate could resent an obvious recruitment if he/she realizes this is why the recruiter was interested in befriending the candidate.

The recruiter introduces an agreeable candidate to a handler. The handler adds the new agent to his cell. The handler trains the recruits and guides them in the gathering of information, clandestine communications, countersurveillance, etc.

Unsympathetic

Unsympathetic candidates tend to be neutral or aligned with the enemy but are vulnerable perhaps due to something they have done or could be tempted into doing (financial problems, alcoholism, drug addiction, infidelity, etc.).

- Enemy leaders who can be compromised, blackmailed, bribed, or threatened.
- Enemy military personnel with weaknesses that the spotter has identified.
- Government employees in key positions such as postal personnel, clerks for leaders, couriers, security personnel, logistical personnel, communications experts, etc.
- Enemy agents. "When the enemy sends spies to pry into my accomplishments or lack of them, I bribe them lavishly, turn them around, and make them my agents." (Li Ch'uan, c. 618-905 A.D)

Unsympathetic candidates can be spotted and recruited in much the same way as sympathetic candidates, but it normally requires a different motivation, whether it be, as examples, fear of being compromised after being photographed with the wrong person or doing the wrong thing. Another approach is for the recruiter to ask a seemingly small favor that is a minor breach of security and then pay for it. The payment could be

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much more than the information is worth, and such small favors can continue until the recruiter asks for a larger favor. If the individual refuses, he is threatened with exposure. Photographs, canceled checks, and other forms of proof can be used to put teeth in the threat. If this person does not cooperate or if the recruiter feels the individual may go to the authorities, he should be lured to a place that allows his termination and the escape of the recruiter. The recruiter will leave the area because of his association with the individual.

If the candidate has intimate knowledge of an enemy installation that is a planned target, he could give up much information to a recruiter in casual conversation. If the target is to be attacked, the candidate can be kidnapped after being lured to an area where there are no witnesses and interrogated for detailed information that will assist in the attack.

Last but not least, information can often be bought. If information is paid for but turns out to be false, action should be taken to ensure the individual understands his mistake and doesn't make it again, and that others gain enlightenment from his mistake.

Information Flow

The flow of information is from the cells up to the area command. Only the area command maintains the information and processes it into intelligence. This is not to say that at lower levels within the command individual leaders do not try to catalog information and process it mentally; they just don't process it before passing it up. The area command has much better resources to check the information for authenticity and accuracy. It can also be compared with intelligence gained from other areas to form a bigger picture of enemy strategy, capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. Intelligence ultimately is disseminated on a need-to-know basis only to allow secure planning of operations and enhance the security of subordinate units.

Military Intelligence

Military intelligence requires a separate group to gain and maintain intelligence on enemy military units, their emplacements, methods of operating, commanders, weapons, logistics, strengths, weaknesses, discipline, and tactics. To gain information, the military branch of the resistance conducts operations. Very often, information is obtained during both offensive and defensive tactical operations.

Operations conducted with the specific purpose of gaining information consist of, but are not limited to reconnaissance and prisoner snatches.

Reconnaissance

Small teams are sent out to observe and not be detected. If they are detected, the information may not be as useful, or they may be overwhelmed by a superior enemy force. They may be sent to confirm or deny other sources of information or to gather information that will be used for the planning of local operations. Recon teams can be used to watch trails, roads, rivers, and other transportation corridors. They can watch small towns, villages, and enemy facilities and encampments. Teams make detailed notes and drawings. They note when and where things are seen or happen.

Prisoner Snatch

Teams can be sent to capture an enemy soldier or government official. Because of the need for surprise, a small team is usually used. Larger units may be stationed to support the snatch team after seizure of the target.

Usually, silent capture is desirable because of the likelihood of enemy reaction. Techniques used for the snatch will depend upon the situation, but regardless of what techniques are used, they are characterized by detailed planning and preparation, surprise, stealth, speed, overwhelming superiority, and support.

NOTE: One thing to bear in mind when deciding the method of disabling the target is that excessive blood loss causes shock. Shock causes death. Dead men cannot talk.

The snatch team may recon the area to determine the best location and time to execute the operation. Detailed information is needed on such things as routes and methods of enemy travel, size of patrols, size of point elements, security measures, weapons, readiness (do they carry their weapons at the ready?), alertness, discipline, and techniques for such things as gathering water (do they come alone to get water?), and relieving themselves (do they use the buddy system?). Specific questions to be answered include when does the enemy sweep roads in the area? How far do they sweep on each side? Are routes to and from enemy watering points and latrines guarded? What areas along enemy routes of travel are difficult to observe? What are the best approaches to and from the enemy routes of travel?

Once the snatch team has the information it needs, the leader finalizes plans. The team will have rehearsed the technique to be used before entering the area. The best routes of approach and withdrawal are selected, and whatever support is available is briefed.

In Vietnam, American forces had the advantage of air support. When snatch operations were conducted, we could call for extraction. This will most likely not be available to the insurgent. Instead, the enemy may have aircraft as well as reinforcements. This situation may make delaying techniques appealing. Trip wires, antipersonnel mines, indirect fire support, snipers, ambushes, and diversions are all methods of delaying enemy reaction to fire.

Some U.S. Army Special Forces snatch operations in Vietnam (and surrounding countries) used the ambush in conjunction with pure bravado to take prisoners. This was done after an extensive recon.

One such technique had the team leader along with another man positioned a few feet up the trail from the rest of the team, which would be laying in ambush. When a small enemy patrol walked by, the two men would move out onto the trail behind the last man. The team leader would have a baseball bat; the other man would have his weapon ready to shoot anyone who looked back. It was timed such that when the enemy patrol moved into the kill zone, the man with the bat hit the last man across the back of the shoulders very hard. He would then fall to the ground on top of the target while the ambush was sprung. All other enemy personnel were killed by the ambush and the man next to the team leader. Usually someone had a tranquilizer injection ready to sedate the target to help control him and prevent shock.

The operation was carefully planned and timed. Helicopter extraction was done as soon as possible. An observation plane and possibly helicopter gun ships and jets were waiting to provide air support. Preplanned landing zones were used (primary and alternates).

As said before, a guerrilla force is not likely to have extensive support, so good intelligence, recon, planning, rehearsals, local support, and delaying techniques take on added importance.

Prisoner Interrogation

In spite of popular opinion, interrogating an enemy soldier is not done with a big knife pressed against his throat. It is best done by a trained person or team of interrogators. With rare exceptions, a terrified person will tell you anything he thinks you want to hear to save his life. Instead, taking the person away from the immediate combat area, isolating him from people and creature comforts, providing minimal water and food, and preventing him from relieving himself or sleeping will usually weaken his will.

When the prisoner is ready for interrogation, one method used is the Mutt and Jeff technique. It works like this. A two-man interrogation technique is used, and their performance must be convincing. One interrogator is openly hostile and does most of the talking while the other one observes. If the prisoner does not become cooperative, any information that may be already known is used against him. He is asked questions for which the answers are known by the interrogators. Whenever he lies he is punished (*nonlethal*). He is told that they already know the answers to most of the questions, but they need him to verify certain things.

If the prisoner remains uncooperative, the aggressive interrogator pretends to make an attempt to harm him but is stopped by the silent one. The less aggressive interrogator convinces the aggressive one to leave and let him conduct the interrogation.

The interrogator tells the prisoner that he saved him this time, but he may not be there next time. In order to prevent him from getting hurt, he needs some cooperation. He tells him to give him something, no matter how small. The interrogator then asks questions that he already knows the answers to (if possible). When he starts getting truthful cooperation, he begins asking real questions. The interrogator may give small rewards for cooperation. He attempts to develop a sense of trust but maintains strict control.

After a prisoner begins to cooperate, the interrogator attempts to reconstruct as much of the detail prior to his capture as possible. One very good method of doing this is map tracking. The interrogator uses a map to locate where the individual was captured and goes backward in time, asking the individual detailed questions about every aspect of his activities. The interrogator can trace the prisoner's movements prior to capture by asking questions about key terrain features, water sources, towns, etc. The interrogator goes back as far as he can. Initially, he is interested in information

of an immediate nature. Later, after such information has been sent forward to be evaluated, the interrogator seeks longer term information such as the prisoner's induction into the military, type and location of training, the units he has been with and when, names of commanders and fellow soldiers, and discipline of units.

Ferrets and Rauses

Operations can be conducted to see how the enemy will react in order to gain information about his tactics, weapons, discipline, etc. Resistance forces can fake activities to fool the enemy and gain intelligence. Rumors can be spread by the underground and auxiliary to cause the enemy to respond. Do they act on rumors? Do they send recon teams? If the resistance does it enough, do they stop responding? When the enemy stops responding, it may signal frustration or a realization that they should react to valid intelligence and not rumors. When they realize this, there may be an extended lag in time until they can develop and process intelligence. This window may provide opportunities.

Tactical Operations

Much of the military information about the enemy is gathered during the conduct of normal combat operations. Resistance forces must be taught how to gather information about the enemy and report it to their leaders. Leaders send the information forward as soon as possible. Often, intelligence officers accompany the resistance forces on combat operations in order to conduct training, observe procedures for gathering information, and advise leaders about gathering information.

Each unit must adhere to standard procedures for gathering and forwarding information. Normally, the military intelligence group establishes these procedures and may perform audits on units (with permission of the unit commander).

Debriefing

After all operations, the unit goes through a debriefing. This debriefing should be conducted by a trained intelligence officer. Often, intelligence personnel are permanently assigned to units.

Debriefings are done to gather as much information about the enemy and his activities as possible. Information about the terrain, civilians, transportation routes, weather, and anything else the intelligence officer feels is valid is covered in a thorough debriefing. Photographs, drawings, terrain models, and maps are useful.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence is comprised of actions taken to prevent or reduce the enemy's ability to gain information about the resistance. The following are miscellaneous counterintelligence issues applicable to the guerrilla warfare environment.

Need to Know. As mentioned before, even if a member of the resistance is cleared to receive a level of classified information, he is not allowed access to it unless he has the need to know.

Restricted Access. Restricting access is reducing or eliminating nonessential personnel access to or through an area. This is to prevent them from gaining knowledge of friendly actions, equipment, or installations that could later be compromised to the enemy.

As an example of this, if the resistance forces use a bordering country as a sanctuary, they should attempt to control areas of the border or make them no man's land. The movement of all personnel other than active partisan fighters in this area is made to be very dangerous. One of the reasons for this is to deny the enemy information about movements along the border. Another reason is to help prevent the enemy from isolating the resistance from their

sanctuaries or interrupting the movement of supplies, wounded, or reinforcements.

Another example of restricted access is securing an area where the resistance is making some type of tactical preparation, such as an isolation area. Isolation areas are where units are taken to separate them from all others before giving them a mission to prepare for. Until they return from the mission, contact with anyone outside of the unit is forbidden to prevent security leaks.

Diaries. Soldiers are not allowed to maintain diaries. If these fall into enemy hands, they can provide valuable information to the enemy.

Letters. Soldiers should be allowed to correspond with loved ones, but it should be limited in frequency and time. If preparations are being made for an operation, they should not be allowed to write or mail letters. During times of limited activity, they may give the letters to a designated intelligence officer. This person may censor these letters to prevent sensitive information from being compromised inadvertently.

Conversation. Troops are instructed not to discuss military matters with others. If a civilian or anyone else that does not have the need to know asks questions about his unit's mission, encampments, weapons strength, etc., it should be reported.

Telephone Security. As with radios, persons that use the telephone should know that the enemy is probably listening. In some situations, computers with high-speed modems can be used. If available, some sort of good encryption software should be used.

Other Forms of Communications. When time and circumstances permit, communications other than radio should be used. Such methods include messengers, signal mirrors, flags, smoke, and homing pigeons.

If messages are very simple, they may be memorized for security, but the message is subject to distortion, and it can-

not be coded very well. Most situations will call for written, coded messages.

Equipment. Troops are instructed to avoid abandoning equipment because the enemy can often gain intelligence from it or use it against them. If equipment cannot be taken with them, they destroy it to prevent its use by the enemy.

Personnel Killed in Action. Every attempt is made to not leave dead personnel behind, because in addition to the morale problems it can cause, the enemy may get valuable information from them such as physical conditioning, health, nutrition, armaments, and discipline. If he is identified, retaliation against his family or village could result. If the dead must be left, an attempt is made to sterilize them by removing anything that could provide information to the enemy.

Documentation. All documentation is strictly controlled, and if the unit is about to be overrun, it is destroyed. The preferred method of destruction is to burn it and spread the ashes.

False Information. Incorrect information can be left where it is likely to be found by the enemy. This could give false information about planned operations or personnel, or it can implicate an enemy official.

Refugee Camps. In many situations, war creates refugees. Refugees often end up in camps. These camps should be avoided by the guerrillas as a whole since the enemy can be expected to have agents in them or at least watch them. If family members or friends are in these camps, guerrillas will try to contact them. They should be restricted from these camps. Any communications with individuals in the camps should be done through members of the resistance assigned to this task. The refugees can be expected to repeat what they hear.

Local Security. Tactical units must actively patrol and observe for their own security. They must never let their guard down when in hostile territory. Resistance units must never rely on civilians to warn them of enemy approach.

They must have multiple avenues of withdrawal, rehearsed withdrawal plans, and a defensive plan to be used if surrounded and breakout is not immediately feasible.

Sterilizing the Area. Resistance units sterilize areas when they prepare to leave in order to make it look like they were never there. Even if the enemy does find the location, it will make discerning information from it much more difficult.

Radio Communications Security.

Radio provides a form of communications in military operations that has advantages other forms do not. But there is a price paid for this speed—security. To limit the effects of this security issue yet still use the speed of radio, the radio operator must be aware of how it becomes a security problem and take defensive measures to minimize the risk.

Early in an insurgency, the use of radios should be highly restricted, especially if the enemy has any type of sophistication or has allies that do. This is because by using radio direction finding (RDF) equipment, the transmitter can be located within a few meters within seconds under excellent conditions. There should *never* be a radio transmission from a guerrilla base unless enemy contact has been made and they already are aware of the exact location of the base.

Radio transmitters emit energy from the antenna. Depending on the design, the radio can emit energy if it is just turned on. The most significant amount of energy is, of course, emitted during transmission.

The type of antenna used helps determine the direction or directions of the bulk of the transmitted energy. Some antennas are directional (fig. 50), some are bi-directional (fig. 51), and some are omnidirectional (360 degrees, fig. 52). By selecting the correct type of antenna, most of the energy can be directed toward the intended reception station and not in other directions.